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To make precise the sense in which the operational predictions of quantum theory conflict with a
classical worldview, it is necessary to articulate a notion of classicality within an operational framework.
A widely applicable notion of classicality of this sort is whether or not the predictions of a given
operational theory can be explained by a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. We here explore
what notion of classicality this implies for the generalized probabilistic theory (GPT) that arises from
a given operational theory, focusing on prepare-measure scenarios. We first show that, when mapping
an operational theory to a GPT by quotienting relative to operational equivalences, the constraint
of explainability by a generalized-noncontextual ontological model is mapped to the constraint of
explainability by an ontological model. We then show that, under the additional assumption that the
ontic state space is of finite cardinality, this constraint on the GPT can be expressed as a geometric
condition which we term simplex-embeddability. Whereas the traditional notion of classicality for a GPT
is that its state space be a simplex and its effect space be the dual of this simplex, simplex-embeddability
merely requires that its state space be embeddable in a simplex and its effect space in the dual of that
simplex. We argue that simplex-embeddability constitutes an intuitive and freestanding notion of
classicality for GPTs. Our result also has applications to witnessing nonclassicality in prepare-measure
experiments.
In what precise sense does quantum theory necessitate
a departure from a classical worldview? Although this is
one of the central questions in the foundations of quantum
theory, there is no consensus on its answer. Arguably the
two most stringent notions of nonclassicality proposed to
date are: the failure to admit of a locally causal ontological
model (Bell’s theorem) [1, 2] and the failure to admit of a
generalized-noncontextual ontological model [3]. Both of
these are operationally meaningful notions of nonclassical-
ity, in the sense that one can determine in principle whether
a given set of operational statistics admits of a classical
explanation by their lights, regardless of its consistency
with quantum theory.1 This implies that any experimental
evidence for such nonclassicality imposes a constraint on
any physical theory that hopes to be empirically adequate,
including any putative successor to quantum theory.
For prepare-measure experiments on a single system, the
notion of local causality is not applicable, and so, of the two
notions, only generalized noncontextuality is a candidate
for an operationally meaningful notion of classicality for
such experiments. Elsewhere [14] it has been argued that
its operational meaningfulness and its larger scope of appli-
cability make the notion of generalized noncontextuality
the best notion of classicality available today. Further-
more, it can be shown to subsume the central ideas behind
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1 Refs. [4–9] provide alternative proposals for how to operationalize
the Kochen-Specker notion of noncontextuality [10]. See Refs. [11–
13] for a critique of these.
several other notions of classicality, such as the existence
of a nonnegative quasiprobability representation [15, 16],
or of a locally causal model [1, 2]. Additionally, the fail-
ure of generalized noncontextuality has been shown to be
behind certain notions of nonclassicality, such as anoma-
lous weak values [17, 18] and advantages for information
processing [19–28].
Within the framework of ontological models [3], assum-
ing generalized noncontextuality can be understood as
assuming a version of a methodological principle for theory
construction due to Leibniz: the ontological identity of
empirical indiscernibles (see Ref. [29] and the appendix of
Ref. [12]). Given that Einstein made significant use of this
principle when he developed the theory of Relativity [29],
it is seen to have impressive credentials in physics and
therefore is a natural constraint to impose on ontological
models. From this perspective, the impossibility of finding
generalized-noncontextual ontological models is best un-
derstood as a failing of the framework of ontological models
itself, and hence as a type of nonclassicality.
An operational theory provides an account of the ex-
perimental procedures accessible in the lab and the oper-
ational statistics they yield. A generalized probabilistic
theory [30, 31] (GPT) is obtained from an operational
theory by discarding information about experimental pro-
cedures that can be varied without affecting the operational
statistics. An ontological model of an operational theory
or of a GPT is an attempt to provide a realist underpinning
to these, that is, a causal account of the statistics they
predict. We will here characterize what the existence of
a generalized-noncontextual ontological model of an op-
erational theory implies about the geometry of the GPT
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2associated to the operational theory. Ultimately, we will
prove the following:
Theorem 1. For a prepare-measure experiment, the op-
erational theory describing it admits of a generalized-
noncontextual ontological model on an ontic state space of
finite cardinality if and only if the GPT describing it is
simplex-embeddable.
Simplex embeddability, defined rigorously in Definition 1,
stipulates that there is a linear map that embeds the state
space in a simplex and another linear map that embeds the
effect space in the dual of this simplex, such that the pair
of maps together preserve inner products.
Hence, if one takes explainability by a generalized-
noncontextual model as one’s notion of classicality for an op-
erational theory, then one must take simplex-embeddability
as one’s notion of classicality for a GPT. This is in contrast
with the prevailing idea (see, e.g., [31]) that a GPT should
be deemed classical if and only if its state space is a simplex
and its effect space is the dual thereof, a condition which we
term simpliciality. In our conclusions, we discuss the sig-
nificance of the difference between simplex embeddability
and simpliciality as notions of classicality for a GPT.
We begin by introducing the requisite preliminary con-
cepts.
Operational Theories— An operational theory is a min-
imal type of theory that stipulates, for a given system, a set
of preparation procedures and measurement procedures
that can be implemented on that system, denoted Preps and
Mmts respectively. These are conceptualized as lists of lab
instructions that one could implement on the given system.
We will here find it useful to consider operational effects,
defined as the tuple consisting of a measurement and an out-
come thereof. We obtain the set of all operational effects,
denoted Effects, by considering the set of all outcomes k for
each measurement M in the set Mmts. A particular opera-
tional effect will be denoted [k|M ]. An operational theory
stipulates a probability rule that determines the probabil-
ity of obtaining operational effect [k|M ] given preparation
P , denoted Pr([k|M ],P ). This probability rule must be
compatible with certain relations that hold between the
procedures.2 For instance, if P1 is described as a procedure
that convexly mixes P2 and P3, with the choice determined
by a coin-flipping mechanism, then Pr([k|M ],P1) must
be equal to the corresponding mixture of Pr([k|M ],P2)
and Pr([k|M ],P3) for all [k|M ] [30]. For operational ef-
fects, analogous constraints from convexity hold, as do
additional constraints due to coarse-graining relationships
among operational effects. For example, if one operational
effect [k1|M1] is described as being the coarse-graining of
two others, [k2|M2] and [k3|M3], then Pr([k1|M1],P ) must
be the sum of Pr([k2|M2],P ) and Pr([k3|M3],P ) for all P .
2 In previous work (and here), these relations are only stipulated
in the “ordinary language” description of the procedures. In
forthcoming work [32], we show how they can be incorporated into
the formal structure of an operational theory.
As we comment below, these constraints on Pr( , ) have
important consequences for the generalized probabilistic
theory associated to the operational theory.
In all, an operational theory of a prepare-measure
experiment on a single system is a triple T :=
{Preps,Mmts,Pr( , )} satisfying these constraints.
Finally, we define the notion of operational equivalence
of procedures [3]. Preparation procedures P and P ′ are
said to be operationally equivalent, denoted P 'P ′, if they
give rise to the same statistics for all physically possible
operational effects, that is, if Pr([k|M ],P )=Pr([k|M ],P ′)
for all [k|M ] ∈ Effects. Operational effects [k|M ] and
[k′|M ′] are said to be operationally equivalent, denoted
[k|M ] ' [k′|M ′], if they give rise to the same statis-
tics for all physically possible preparations, that is, if
Pr([k|M ],P )=Pr([k′|M ′],P ) for all P ∈Preps.
Generalized Probabilistic Theories— The framework
of generalized probabilistic theories provides a means of de-
scribing the landscape of possible theories of the world, as
characterized (solely) by the operational statistics they pre-
dict [30, 31]. Quantum and classical theories are included
as special cases, but the framework also accommodates
alternatives to these. Although the framework allows for se-
quential and parallel composition of processes, we will focus
on the fragment of a GPT that describes prepare-measure
experiments on a single system.
A given GPT associates to a system a convex set of states,
Ω. One can think of this set as being a generalization of
the Bloch ball in quantum theory, where the states in the
set are the normalised (potentially mixed) states of the
theory. We make the standard assumptions that Ω is finite
dimensional and compact. While Ω naturally lives inside an
affine space, AffSpan[Ω], for convenience we will represent
it as living inside a real inner product space (V,〈 , 〉) of
one dimension higher, where we embed AffSpan[Ω] as a
hyperplane in V which does not intersect with the origin 0.
This is analogous to embedding the Bloch-Ball within the
real vector space of Hermitian matrices. The reason for
doing so is that we can then define both the GPT states
and GPT effects within the same space.
Note that we will not restrict attention to GPTs satisfying
the no-restriction hypothesis [33], which stipulates that all
the states and effects that are logically possible must also
be physically possible.
A GPT also associates to every system a set of GPT
effect vectors, E . In the framework of GPTs, the probability
of obtaining an effect e∈E given a state s∈Ω is given by
the inner product:
Prob(e,s) :=〈e,s〉. (1)
We require that E must satisfy the following constraints. If
one defines the dual of Ω, denoted Ω∗, as the set of vectors
in V whose inner product with all state vectors in Ω is
between 0 and 1, i.e.,
Ω∗ :={x∈V |〈x,s〉∈ [0,1] ∀s∈Ω}, (2)
then E is a compact convex set contained in Ω∗, E ⊆Ω∗,
which contains the origin 0 and the “unit effect” u, which
3in turn satisfy, respectively, 〈0,s〉=0 and 〈u,s〉=1 for all
s∈Ω. Due to how we embedded AffSpan[Ω] within V , u
necessarily exists and is unique.3
The state and effect spaces of any valid GPT must satisfy
the principle of tomography, which states that the GPT
states and GPT effects can be uniquely identified by the
probabilities that they produce. Formally, for the GPT
states, we have that 〈e,s1〉 = 〈e,s2〉 for all e ∈ E if and
only if s1 = s2, and for the GPT effects, we have that
〈e1,s〉=〈e2,s〉 for all s∈Ω if and only if e1=e2.
A GPT G, therefore, is defined as a quadruple G :=
(V,〈 , 〉,Ω,E) satisfying these constraints.
The GPT associated to an Operational Theory—
The GPT associated to an operational theory T is the
theory that one obtains when one quotients T relative to
the notion of operational equivalence defined above. It is
specified by a pair of quotienting maps
s :Preps→Ω and e :Effects→E (3)
taking each preparation P (operational effect [k|M ]) to
a GPT state vector sP (GPT effect vector e[k|M ]) repre-
senting its operational equivalence class. The maps jointly
satisfy the constraint that
Pr([k|M ],P )=〈e[k|M ],sP 〉 (4)
for all preparations and effects in the operational theory.
Note that Eq. (4) and the assumption of tomography
guarantee that every operationally equivalent pair of prepa-
rations (effects) in the operational theory is mapped to
the same GPT state (GPT effect) vector, and hence that
each GPT vector is a representation of an operational
equivalence class of operational procedures. That is:
P 'P ′ ⇐⇒ sP =sP ′ and (5)
[k|M ]' [k′|M ′] ⇐⇒ e[k|M ] =e[k′|M ′] (6)
Furthermore, they imply that nontrivial convex and coarse-
graining relations holding among preparations (respec-
tively effects) in the operational theory are encoded in the
geometric relations between the GPT state vectors (respec-
tively GPT effect vectors) in the GPT. For example, if P1
is a convex mixture of P2 and P3 with weightsw and (1−w)
(or if P1 is operationally equivalent to such a mixture), then
it will follow that sP1 =wsP2+(1−w)sP3 .
Ontological Model of an Operational Theory—
An ontological model of an operational theory T is an
attempt to provide a causal explanation of the operational
statistics of T . For a prepare-measure experiment, it posits
that the response of the measurement is determined (possi-
bly probabilistically) by the ontic state λ of the system (a
complete characterization of its physical attributes), while
preparation procedures determine the distribution over the
space of ontic states, Λ, from which λ is sampled.
3 This uniqueness is referred to as the “causality axiom” in Ref. [33].
More precisely, an ontological model associates to each
preparation P ∈Preps a normalized probability distribu-
tion over Λ, denoted µP , representing an agent’s knowledge
of the ontic state when they know that the preparation
was P . Denoting the set of such distributions by D[Λ], the
ontological model specifies a map
µ :Preps→D[Λ]. (7)
Furthermore, an ontological model associates to each op-
erational effect [k|M ]∈Effects a response function on Λ,
denoted ξ[k|M ], where ξ[k|M ](λ) represents the probability
assigned to the outcome k in a measurement of M if the
ontic state of the system fed into the measurement device
were known to be λ∈Λ. Denoting the set of such response
functions by F [Λ], the ontological model specifies a map
ξ :Effects→F [Λ]. (8)
These two maps must preserve the convex and coarse-
graining relations between operational procedures that
were discussed above. For example, ifP1 is a convex mixture
of P2 and P3 with weightsw and (1−w), then µP1 =wµP2+
(1−w)µP3 [3], and similarly for operational effects. Finally,
the ontological model must reproduce the probability rule
of the operational theory T via
Pr([k|M ],P )=
∑
λ∈Λ
ξ[k|M ](λ)µP (λ). (9)
(where we have assumed Λ to be discrete for simplicity).
Generalized Noncontextuality— We are now in a po-
sition to define the notion of classicality of an operational
theoryT with which we are concerned in this article, namely,
the existence of a generalized-noncontextual ontological
model of T . An ontological model of a prepare-measure
experiment satisfies generalized noncontextuality if every
two procedures which are operationally equivalent have
identical representations in the ontological model.
In other words, the constraint for preparations is that
P 'P ′ =⇒ µP =µP ′ , (10)
while the constraint for operational effects is that
[k|M ]' [k′|M ′] =⇒ ξ[k|M ] =ξ[k′|M ′]. (11)
These constraints formalize the Leibnizian principle dis-
cussed in the introduction insofar as the empirical indis-
cernibility of procedures (the antecedents) imply the equal-
ity of their ontological representations (the consequents).
Ontological Model of a GPT— As is the case for an
ontological model of an operational theory, an ontological
model of a GPT is an attempt to provide a causal expla-
nation of the operational statistics in terms of a space Λ
of ontic states for the system. In this case, however, what
is being modelled ontologically are not preparations and
measurements, but operational equivalence classes thereof.
Thus, an ontological model of a GPT associates to each
GPT state vector s∈Ω a normalized probability distribu-
tion over Λ, denoted µ˜s ∈D[Λ], and to each GPT effect
4vector e∈E a response function on Λ, denoted ξ˜e∈F [Λ].
Hence, it specifies a pair of maps
µ˜ :Ω→D[Λ] and ξ˜ :E→F [Λ], (12)
which must be linear by the assumption that they preserve
the convex and coarse-graining relations defined by the
geometry of the GPT state and GPT effect spaces. Finally,
the ontological model must reproduce the probability rule
of the GPT via
〈e,s〉=
∑
λ∈Λ
ξ˜e(λ)µ˜s(λ). (13)
It is now clear that a generalized-noncontextual ontolog-
ical model of an operational theory T is equivalent to an
ontological model of the GPT associated to T . (An explicit
proof is given in the Supplemental Material.) Hence:
Proposition 1. There exists a generalized-noncontextual
ontological model of an operational theory T describing
prepare-measure experiments on a system if and only if
there exists an ontological model of the GPT G that T
defines.
As we show in the Supplementary Material, an ontologi-
cal model of a GPT is equivalent to a positive quasiprob-
ability representation of that GPT. Hence, Proposition 1
is the generalization of the results of Refs. [15, 16] from
quantum theory to an arbitrary GPT.
Note that ontological models of GPTs, unlike those of
operational theories, cannot be said to be either generalized-
contextual or generalized-noncontextual. Recall that con-
texts are defined as differences among procedures that are
operationally equivalent, so there is no notion of context in
a GPT, since the latter is obtained by quotienting relative
to operational equivalences. To ask whether the ontological
representation of a GPT state (or GPT effect) varies with
context is a category mistake since there is no variability
of context for GPT states (or GPT effects), just as it is a
category mistake to ask whether X varies with Y when Y
exhibits no variability [34].
This implies another contrast between ontological mod-
els of GPTs and those of operational theories. For a given
operational theory, one can always construct an ontological
model by allowing this model to be generalized-contextual
(using the analogue of the construction of Ref. [35]). But it
is not the case that one can always construct an ontological
model of a GPT because such models do not have the bene-
fit of the representational flexibility afforded by nontrivial
context-dependences. Indeed, it is this lack of flexibility
that implies the necessity of negativity in quasiprobability
representations of some GPTs [15, 16].
The Geometric Criterion associated to
Noncontextuality— We argued in the introduc-
tion that an operational theory is best viewed as classical
if its operational predictions admit of an explanation in
terms of a generalized-noncontextual ontological model.
It is natural, therefore, to determine what this notion
of classicality for an operational theory entails for the
GPT that the latter defines. By Proposition 1, this is
equivalent to finding a criterion for when a GPT admits of
an ontological model. We now give such a condition, which
we term simplex-embeddability, under the assumption that
the ontological model has an ontic state space Λ of finite
cardinality. At the end of the article, we mention some
follow-up works that lift this restriction.
Definition 1 (Simplex-embeddable GPTs). A GPT de-
scribing a prepare-measure experiment, G=(V,〈 , 〉V ,Ω,E),
is simplex-embeddable iff there exists (i) an inner product
space (W,〈 , 〉W ) of some dimension d which contains a
(d−1)-dimensional (hence d-vertex) simplex ∆d (whose
affine span does not contain the origin) and its dual hy-
percube ∆∗d, and (ii) a pair of linear maps ι,κ : V →W
satisfying
ι(Ω)⊆∆d, (14)
κ(E)⊆∆∗d, and (15)
〈e,s〉V =〈κ(e),ι(s)〉W ∀e∈E , ∀s∈Ω. (16)
Note that while it is only the space of GPT states which
embeds within a simplex, while the space of GPT effects em-
beds within a hypercube dual to this simplex, we nonethe-
less use the term ‘simplex-embeddable’ as an umbrella term
for the pair of embedding relations.
With this definition in hand, one can prove the following
(as we show in the Supplementary Material).
Theorem 2. A GPT describing a prepare-measure exper-
iment admits of an ontological model over an ontic space Λ
of finite cardinality if and only if it is simplex-embeddable.
Crucially, note that the dimension of the vector space in
which this embedding can be constructed may be greater
than the native dimension of the GPT. We provide an
explicit example of the necessity of such a ‘dimension gap’
in the Supplementary Material, Section D.
By combining Proposition 1 and Theorem 2, one imme-
diately obtains our main result, Theorem 1, which gives a
geometric characterization of the set of GPTs that are asso-
ciated to operational theories which admit of generalized-
noncontextual ontological models over ontic state spaces
of finite cardinality.
Discussion— As noted earlier, the prevailing view up
to now has been that a GPT should be deemed classical
if and only if it is simplicial, i.e., if its state space is a
simplex and its effect space is the hypercube that is dual
to this simplex. To understand the distinction between
simpliciality and simplex-embeddability, we recall a dis-
tinction between notions of nonclassicality introduced in
Ref. [36]4: an operational theory is deemed weakly non-
classical if it exhibits measurement incompatibility (sets
of measurements that cannot all be simulated by process-
ing the outcome of a single measurement) or ambiguity
4 Note, however, that there it was the nonclassicality of operational
phenomena rather than of operational theories that was at issue.
5of mixtures (mixed states with multiple convex decom-
positions into pure states) or both, while it is deemed
strongly nonclassical if it furthermore fails to admit of a
generalized-noncontextual ontological model. This distinc-
tion can be extended from operational theories to GPTs
using Proposition 1: a GPT is deemed weakly nonclassical
if it exhibits measurement incompatibility5 or ambiguity of
mixtures or both, while it is deemed strongly nonclassical
if it furthermore fails to admit of an ontological model.
Because a GPT exhibits measurement incompatibility if
and only if its effect space is not a hypercube [37] and it
exhibits ambiguity of mixtures if and only if its state space
is not a simplex, it follows that the notion of nonclassicality
captured by nonsimpliciality of a GPT (the focus of previ-
ous work) is merely weak nonclassicality. By contrast, the
notion of nonclassicality captured by the failure of simplex
embeddability (introduced here) is exactly that of strong
nonclassicality.
For both operational theories and GPTs, the strong no-
tion of nonclassicality captures the idea that operational
predictions resist a classical explanation. In light of Theo-
rem 1, each of the motivations listed in the introduction for
taking generalized noncontextuality as a good notion of clas-
sical explainability for operational theories can be reappro-
priated as a motivation for taking simplex-embeddability
as a good notion of classical explainability for a GPT.
In the reverse direction, Theorem 1 provides a novel and
independently motivated justification for generalized non-
contextuality as a good notion of classical explainability
of an operational theory, since at the level of the GPT,
simplex-embeddability is a very natural way to formalize
the notion of classical explainability.
In related work undertaken simultaneously [38], Shahan-
deh considers the consequences of a notion of noncontextu-
ality, termed broad noncontextuality, which differs from the
notion of generalized noncontextuality. As we show in the
Supplementary Material, our results imply that the geomet-
ric condition on a GPT associated to this notion is simplex
embeddability without a dimension gap. Ref. [38] focuses
on GPTs that satisfy the no-restriction hypothesis [33] and
demonstrates that for such GPTs, simplex-embeddability
without a dimension gap coincides with simpliciality.6 We
discuss the relation between Ref. [38] and this work further
in the Supplementary Material, and also demonstrate that
it is only for GPTs satisfying the no-restriction hypothe-
sis that simplex embeddability and simpliciality coincide.
5 In our formalization of GPTs, a measurement is any collection of
effects that sum to the unit effect.
6 For many years, the no-restriction hypothesis was taken to be a
fundamental part of the definition of a GPT (indeed, it was only
in Ref. [33] in 2009 that the term ‘no-restriction hypothesis’ was
coined), but it was later acknowledged to be a substantial restric-
tion on the sorts of GPTs which could be considered. Examples of
GPTs that violate the no-restriction hypothesis include: the GPT
associated to Spekkens’ toy model [39], the stabilizer subtheories
of quantum theory as well as the Gaussian and quadrature subthe-
ories of quantum mechanics [36], and the GPTs considered in, for
example, Refs.[40–45].
Barnum and Lami [46] have found similar results to those
presented here and in Ref. [38], while also considering
generalizations to infinite dimensions.
Applications— Our result provides a novel way to test,
for a given set of experimentally realized preparations
and measurements which are tomographically complete,
whether these provide evidence of strong nonclassicality
or not. One first determines the set of GPTs that are
compatible with the data obtained from prepare-measure
experiments, using the techniques described in Ref. [42]
(because of noise and finite precision effects, it is never a
single GPT that is picked out by the data). One then tests
these GPTs for simplex-embeddability.
The previous gold standard for testing generalized non-
contextuality [12, 47] was to test a specific noise-robust
noncontextuality inequality, obtained from a specific set of
operational equivalences7. Such a test, however, requires
an experimentalist to target a set of preparations and a
set of measurements satisfying these specific operational
equivalences.8 The simplex-embedding test for general-
ized noncontextuality, by contrast, makes use of whatever
operational equivalences happen to be satisfied by the
preparations and measurements that were physically real-
ized. It also makes use of all such equivalences, since these
relations are encoded in the geometry of the state and effect
spaces. Consequently, one needn’t design an experiment
to target particular equivalences.9 Rather, the technique
can be applied to data obtained in any experiment that
achieves tomographic completeness, including those not
dedicated to testing noncontextuality. The technique’s
scope of applicability is therefore much greater and conse-
quently promises greater applications. For instance, our
method can be used to determine whether prepare-measure
data obtained in some experimental architecture for quan-
tum computation (e.g., in a noisy implementation of some
simple quantum algorithm) either does or does not witness
the presence of strong nonclassicality.
It is worth noting two practical issues with testing for
simplex-embeddability. Firstly, one needs some algorithm
for testing whether a generic GPT G (described geomet-
rically) admits an embedding of the type described in
Definition 1 for a given dimension d. Secondly, even given
such an algorithm, the question arises of whether there is
an upper bound on the dimension d up to which one must
apply this test. The latter question has been addressed by
subsequent work, described below.
Note that to merely witness nonclassicality of a given
GPT, it suffices to find inner approximations of its state
7 This set is usually inferred from a pre-existing no-go theorem for
generalized noncontextuality in quantum theory, for instance, those
inspired by Kochen-Specker contradictions [11, 48–50].
8 In fact, because the procedures that are experimentally realized
always deviate from the targets, to satisfy the operational equiva-
lences, one must shift attention to “secondary” procedures which lie
within the convex hull of the realized ones, a step that compromises
some purity [51].
9 Nor post-process the data to satisfy them.
6and effect spaces which do not embed in a simplex and its
dual. Similarly, to merely witness classicality, it suffices
to find outer approximations of these that do embed in a
simplex and its dual. The problem of finding such witnesses
can be simplified, therefore, by making a propitious choice
of the shape of these inner or outer approximations. This
trick can also be applied to experimental data— it suffices
to choose convenient inner and outer approximations to
the spaces of all the GPTs in the set compatible with the
data.
Subsequent work— Two of the key questions raised by
this work have been resolved by subsequent works. First,
the results of Refs. [52] and [53] imply that the dimensional
caveats in our main theorems can be dropped, removing
the primary obstacle to testing for simplex-embeddability
in practice. In particular, Corollary 33 of Ref. [52] provides
a dimension bound given by the square of the GPT’s di-
mension. For tomographically local [54] GPTs, Ref. [53]
provides a tight bound given by the GPT’s dimension itself
(under some natural assumptions). (It follows that every
GPT of finite dimension that admits of an ontological model
admits of one with a finite number of ontic states.) Second,
Ref. [53] extends our result beyond the prepare-measure
scenario to general compositional scenarios.
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Supplementary Material
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
We now prove Proposition 1.
Proof. In one direction, given an ontological model of the
GPT G which is associated to the operational theory T
(via the quotienting maps s and e ), i.e., given the rel-
evant maps µ˜ and ξ˜ , we can construct a generalized-
noncontextual ontological model for T by simply compos-
ing the quotienting map followed by the ontological map;
that is, by constructing
µ := µ˜s (A1)
and
ξ := ξ˜e . (A2)
It is then easy to check that these maps define an ontological
model of the operational theory T . Firstly, µ preserves the
convex relations among preparations, since s preserves
these relations and µ˜ is linear. Similarly, ξ preserves the
convex and coarse-graining relations for operational effects.
The resulting model is easily seen to be noncontextual,
since
P1'P2 =⇒ sP1 =sP2 (A3)
=⇒ µ˜sP1 = µ˜sP2 (A4)
=⇒ µP1 =µP2 , (A5)
and similarly for operational effects. Finally, the two
maps together reproduce the predictions of the operational
8theory, since∑
λ∈Λ
ξ[k|M ](λ)µP (λ)=
∑
λ∈Λ
ξ˜e[k|M](λ)µ˜sP (λ) (A6)
13=
〈
e[k|M ],sP
〉
(A7)
4=Pr([k|M ],P ). (A8)
Conversely, given a generalized-noncontextual ontologi-
cal model of an operational theory T (i.e., given the relevant
maps µ and ξ ), we can construct an ontological model
of the GPT G associated to it (via the relevant maps s
and e ) by defining the maps µ˜ and ξ˜ as the unique linear
maps satisfying
µ˜s :=µP (A9)
for all preparations P such that sP =s, and
ξ˜e :=ξ[k|M ] (A10)
for all operational effects [k|M ] such that e[k|M ] = e. It
is then easy to check that µ˜ preserves the convex rela-
tions between state vectors. E.g., suppose that P1 is a
convex mixture of P2 and P3 with weights w and (1−w), so
that µP1 = wµP2 + (1 − w)µP3 (since µ preserves the
convex relations among preparation procedures). We
therefore find that µ˜sP1 = µP1 = wµP2 + (1− w)µP3 =
wµ˜sP2 +(1−w)µ˜sP3 . Thus, in the example under consid-
eration, sP1 = wsP2 + (1−w)sP3 (given the operational
equivalence of P1 with the mixture of P2 and P3), and
µ˜sP1 =wµ˜sP2 +(1−w)µ˜sP3 , and so µ˜ does indeed preserve
the convex relations among GPT states. The proof that ξ˜
preserves the convex and coarse-graining relations among
GPT effects is analogous.
Finally, the two maps together reproduce the predictions
of the GPT, since∑
λ∈Λ
ξ˜e(λ)µ˜s(λ)=
∑
λ∈Λ
ξ[k|M ](λ)µP (λ) (A11)
9=Pr(P,[k|M ]) (A12)
4=
〈
e[k|M ],sP
〉
(A13)
=〈e,s〉. (A14)
Appendix B: Quasiprobabilistic representations of
GPTs
We have argued that a GPT should be deemed classical
if and only if an ontological representation of it exists.
We now prove the following proposition, which implies
that this notion of classicality is equivalent to another
notion of classicality, namely, the existence of a positive
quasiprobability representation.
Proposition 2. An ontological model of a GPT G describ-
ing prepare-measure experiments on a system is equivalent
to a positive quasiprobability representation thereof.
A quasiprobability representation of a GPT associates
to each system a set Λ. It associates to each GPT state
on this system, s∈Ω, a real-valued function over Λ, de-
noted µˆs and satisfying
∑
λ∈Λµˆs(λ)=1. This is termed a
quasiprobability distribution over Λ because if the function
were valued in [0,1] rather than the reals, it could be inter-
preted as a probability distribution over Λ. Formally, it
specifies a linear map from state vectors to the real vector
space of functions from Λ to R, denoted RΛ. That is,
µˆ :Ω→RΛ. (B1)
It also associates to each GPT effect e a real-valued function
over Λ, denoted ξˆe and satisfying
∑
e∈χ ξˆe(λ) = 1 for all
λ∈Λ where χ is any set of GPT effects corresponding to the
set of outcomes of a possible measurement. Note that such
a set must satisfy
∑
e∈χe=u. The function ξˆe is termed a
quasiresponse function because if the function were valued
in [0,1] rather than the reals, it could be interpreted as a
response function. Formally, it specifies a linear map
ξˆ :E→RΛ. (B2)
Now consider the probability of obtaining GPT effect e
given a preparation associated to state s, which is given by
〈e,s〉V in the GPT. In a quasiprobability representation of
this GPT, one computes this probability using the same
formula that would be appropriate if the quasi-probabilities
were true probabilities, namely,
∑
λ∈Λξˆe(λ)µˆs(λ). Thus,∀e∈E , ∀s∈Ω,
〈e,s〉V = ξˆe ·µˆs=
∑
λ∈Λ
ξˆe(λ)µˆs(λ). (B3)
Finally, we will say that a quasiprobability representation
of a GPT is positive if ∀s∈Ω,∀λ∈Λ: 0≤ µˆs(λ)≤ 1 and
∀e∈E ,∀λ∈Λ: 0≤ ξˆe(λ)≤1.
Prop 2 follows immediately by noting that
Eqs. (B1), (B2) together with the positivity con-
straints are equivalent to Eq. (12), and that Eq. (B3) is
equivalent to Eq. (13).
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 2
We now wish to prove Theorem 2.
It is convenient for the proof to formally define the
notion of a simplicial GPT which was discussed in the
main text. A simplicial GPT of given dimension d is a
tuple (W,〈 , 〉W ,∆d,∆∗d) defined by a vector space W with
inner product 〈 , 〉W , a simplicial state space Ω=∆d (of
intrinsic dimension d−1), and the dual hypercube E=∆∗d
(of intrinsic dimension d) as its effect space. Clearly, the
inner product space, simplex, and the dual appearing in
9the definition of simplex embeddability (Def. 1) define such
a simplicial GPT.10
Next, it is useful to characterize the inherent degeneracies
in the definition of a GPT, that is, to characterize under
what conditions two GPTs make the same operational
predictions, and hence should be deemed equivalent.
Definition 2 (Equivalent GPTs). Two GPTs, G =
(V,〈 , 〉V ,Ω,E) and G′= (V ′,〈 , 〉V ′ ,Ω′,E ′), are said to be
equivalent iff there exist linear isomorphisms ω, :V →V ′
such that:
ω(Ω)=Ω′, (C1)
(E)=E ′, and (C2)
〈e,s〉V =〈e,ωs〉V ′ ∀e∈E , s∈Ω. (C3)
As a simple example, note that the GPT (V,〈 , 〉V ,Ω,T (E)),
where T is a reversible map, is equivalent to the GPT
(V,〈 , 〉V ,T †(Ω),E) where † denotes the adjoint operation
relative to the inner product on the vector space [30].
Now, note that any simplicial GPT of a given dimension
d is equivalent (in the above sense) to one in a particular
canonical form, defined as follows. The vector space is taken
to be Rd with some chosen orthonormal basis {bi}i∈B and
the inner product is taken to be the dot-product with
respect to this basis. The state space is the unit simplex
(with d vertices and intrinsic dimension d−1), defined as
∆d :=ConvexHull[{bi}], (C4)
and the effect space is the dual of it, namely the unit
hypercube (with 2d−1 vertices and intrinsic dimension d)
∆∗d=ConvexHull[{
∑
i∈χbi|χ⊆B}]. (C5)
Finally, the unit effect is u=
∑
i∈Bbi.
At this point it is straightforward to show that the
mathematical structures defining a simplicial GPT are
in one-to-one correspondence with the structures defining
an ontological theory.
First, one identifies one ontic state λ∈Λ with each vertex
i∈Vert[∆d]; that is, one makes a one-to-one correspondence
λ∈Λ↔ i∈Vert[∆d].
Next, one can identify the GPT vector space V with
the vector space RΛ of functions from Λ to R, where the
function associated with each GPT vector is simply its
coordinates along each element of the chosen basis; that is,
10 For a GPTG which is simplex-embeddable but not itself simplicial,
the embedding relation cannot be interpreted as merely due to
technological limitations. To posit that a world is governed by
the GPT G is to posit that the states and effects that are physi-
cally realizable are all and only the states and effects included in
G. Consequently, any states and effects that are included in the
simplicial GPT into which G embeds, but are outside of G, are by
assumption not physically realizable in a world governed by the
GPT G. The embedding relation must therefore be understood
as a fundamental (rather than practical) limitation on what is
possible in such a world.
there is a one-to-one correspondence RΛ↔V . Explicitly,
any vectorw∈V is uniquely identified with a function fw∈
RVert[∆d] by fw(i) :=〈w,bi〉V , where bi is the orthonormal
basis used in the definition of the canonical form (it is the
set of vectors that point to the vertices of ∆d). Clearly, then,
the vertices of ∆d will be represented by point distributions
in RVert[∆d], as fbj (i) = 〈bj ,bi〉V = δij . By linearity, the
other vectors in ∆d will correspond to mixtures of these,
and hence to probability distributions over Vert[∆d]. As
such, there is a one-to-one correspondence D[Λ]↔∆d.
Similarly, the vectors in ∆∗d can be identified with the
response functions. The extremal points of ∆∗d, namely,∑
i∈χ bi, are represented by the functions: f∑j∈χbj(i) =∑
j∈χ 〈bj ,bi〉V =
∑
j∈χ δij , and these correspond to the
extremal response functions in F [Λ]. Again by linearity,
we see that every vector in ∆∗d is identified with a valid
response function. Additionally, the vector u corresponds
to a vector 1 whose components are all equal to 1. Hence,
we have the one-to-one correspondences F [Λ]↔∆∗d and
1↔u.
Finally, the dot product can now be written out in terms
of these functions as 〈w,w′〉V =
∑
i∈Vert[∆d]fw(i)fw′(i),
where the right-hand side defines the dot product in the
ontological space. We denote this correspondence as∑
λ∈Λf (λ)f (λ)↔〈 , 〉V .
We can summarize all this in a table:
ontological geometric
λ∈Λ i∈Vert[∆d]
RΛ V
D[Λ] ∆d
F [Λ] ∆∗d
1 u∑
λ∈Λf (λ)f (λ) 〈 , 〉V
Hence, any simplex-embeddable GPT G can be embed-
ded into a simplicial GPT, whose canonical form together
with the identification in the table can be used to explicitly
construct an ontological model of G.
Conversely, any GPT which admits of an ontological
model can be embedded into a simplex and its dual, which
can be explicitly constructed using the identifications pro-
vided in the table.
This establishes the theorem.
Appendix D: Example of a dimension mismatch:
Stabilizer rebit
We now give an example of a simplex-embeddable GPT
whose state and effect spaces cannot be embedded into a
simplex and its dual (respectively) in a vector space of the
same dimension as the GPT itself. The example is the GPT
associated to the well-known subtheory of the stabilizer
qubit theory containing only the real-amplitude states and
effects, termed the stabilizer rebit quantum subtheory.
For the sake of obtaining a GPT representation of this
theory, we will conceptualize the projectors as vectors in
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the real vector space of Hermitian operators (as opposed
to the complex vector space of arbitrary operators). The
GPT state space of the stabilizer rebit is then the convex
subset
ConvexHull[{|0〉〈0|,|1〉〈1|,|+〉〈+|,|−〉〈−|}] (D1)
of the full qubit state space:
|0〉〈0|
|1〉〈1|
|−〉〈−| |+〉〈+|
and the effect space is the convex subset
ConvexHull[{0,|0〉〈0|,|1〉〈1|,|+〉〈+|,|−〉〈−|,1}] (D2)
of the full qubit effect space.
This stabilizer rebit GPT admits of an ontological model;
one such model is the toy model of Ref. [39]. (We present
this model explicitly at the end of this appendix.) As
demanded by Theorem 2, this implies that the stabilizer
rebit state space can be embedded in a simplex whose
dual contains the stabilizer rebit effect space. Indeed,
the space of probability distributions over ontic states of
the toy model of Ref. [39] defines a tetrahedron which
contains the state space, and whose dual contains the
effect space. Note that the stabilizer rebit state space
is 2-dimensional, while the simplex (the tetrahedron) in
which it is embedded is intrinsically 3-dimensional. As we
now prove, this dimension mismatch is unavoidable: it is
not possible to find an embedding into any intrinsically
2-dimensional simplex such that the effect space embeds
in the dual.
Proof. We assume that there exists a triangle which em-
beds the stabilizer rebit state space, whose dual embeds
the stabilizer rebit effect space, and we then prove a con-
tradiction.
Note that for any of the extremal states, there exists
an effect that evaluates to zero uniquely on that state, for
example given the state |0〉〈0| then we have the effect |1〉〈1|
that gives probability zero only for that state. The set
of states for which this effect evaluates to zero, i.e. those
satisfying tr[|1〉〈1|ρ] = 〈1|ρ|1〉= 0, can be geometrically
represented by a hyperplane in the state space:
|0〉〈0|
|1〉〈1|
|−〉〈−| |+〉〈+|
〈1|ρ|1〉=0
Let us consider the embedding of the state |0〉〈0| into the
triangle. A priori this could go to any point in the triangle.
However, we know that there should be some effect in the
dual that evaluates to zero on this state, and not on any
of the other states we will embed. This means that |0〉〈0|
must be mapped to a point on the boundary of the triangle.
(The only effect that evaluates to zero on an interior point
of the triangle is the zero effect which would also evaluate
to zero on all of the other states).
This means that |0〉〈0| must lie on a proper face of the
triangle, and the associated effect defines the hyperplane
that picks out that face. There are two possibilities here,
|0〉〈0| is mapped to a vertex, or an edge, that is
|0〉〈0|
or |0〉〈0| .
Now consider a second state, e.g. |+〉〈+|. The same ar-
gument applies again, so it must be mapped to some proper
face of the triangle. Moreover, this must be disjoint from
the face into which we embedded |0〉〈0|, since otherwise
the effect associated to |0〉〈0| would also evaluate to zero
on |+〉〈+|, for example:
|0〉〈0|
|+〉〈+|
〈1|ρ|1〉=0
That is, it would imply that tr [|1〉〈1||+〉〈+|] = 0, and
so the ontological model would give predictions different
from those of the GPT. Hence, |0〉〈0| and |+〉〈+| must be
mapped to disjoint faces, for example:
|0〉〈0|
|+〉〈+|
〈1|ρ|1〉=0
〈−|ρ|−〉=0
We can apply this same reasoning to every pair of the four
extremal states of the stabilizer rebit to conclude that these
states must all be mapped to disjoint faces of the triangle.
But there are at most three disjoint faces of a triangle, so
we reach a contradiction.
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a. Explicit ontological model for the stabilizer rebit
This ontological model is obtained directly by taking the
appropriate subsets of the state and effect spaces from the
toy theory of Ref. [39]. The ontic state space is defined as
Λ≡{λ0+,λ0−,λ1+,λ1−}. (D3)
The epistemic states are given by
µ˜|0〉〈0|=(1/2,1/2,0,0),
µ˜|1〉〈1|=(0,0,1/2,1/2),
µ˜|+〉〈+|=(1/2,0,1/2,0),
µ˜|−〉〈−|=(0,1/2,0,1/2). (D4)
The response functions are given by
ξ˜|0〉〈0|=(1,1,0,0),
ξ˜|1〉〈1|=(0,0,1,1),
ξ˜|+〉〈+|=(1,0,1,0),
ξ˜|−〉〈−|=(0,1,0,1). (D5)
It is straightforward to verify that this model reproduces
the operational predictions.
Appendix E: Comparing simplex embeddability and
simpliciality
It is interesting to consider under which conditions the no-
tions of simplex embeddability and simpliciality coincide—
that is, when the notions of weak and strong non-classicality
coincide. Intuitively, this is connected to the no-restriction
hypothesis, which states that every logically possible effect
is a valid physical effect and similarly that every logically
possible state is a valid physical state. This is because if a
GPT is simplex-embeddable but not itself simplicial, then
the extra vectors in the simplex (or its dual) constitute
logically but not physically possible states (effects), and so
the GPT cannot satisfy the no-restriction hypothesis.
If one assumes no dimension gap (i.e., the simplex embed-
ding is into an inner product space of the same dimension
as the GPT vector space), then this intuition about the
connection between the no-restriction hypothesis and weak
and strong notions of classicality can be proved in a partic-
ularly simple manner.
Theorem 3. If a GPT G′ = (V, 〈 , 〉V ,Ω′,E ′) satisfies
the no-restriction hypothesis (that is, E ′ = Ω′∗) and is
moreover simplex-embeddable using an inner product space
(W,〈 , 〉W ) of the same dimension as V ,then G′ is simpli-
cial.
Proof. Consider the simplex embedding of a GPT G′ =
(V,〈 , 〉V ,Ω′,E ′) using an inner product space (W,〈 , 〉W )
via linear maps ι and κ, such that ι(Ω′)⊆∆ and κ(E ′)⊆
∆∗. As we are assuming that the dimension of W is the
same as the dimension of V , it is clear that the GPT
G :=(W,〈 , 〉W ,ι(Ω′),κ(E ′)) is equivalent to G′ in the sense
of Def. 2. For the remainder of this proof, therefore, we
will work with this equivalent GPT, G, and notate Ω :=
ι(Ω′) and E :=κ(E ′). Since G′ satisfies the no-restriction
hypothesis (by assumption), so does G.
By the assumption of simplex embeddability, the set Ω
of all states of G, is contained within a simplex, Ω⊆∆, and
consequently every effect in the hypercube that is dual to
this simplex, ∆∗, gives valid probabilities on all states in
Ω. It follows that every effect in ∆∗ is a logically possible
effect. Under the no-restriction hypothesis, therefore, it
follows that every such effect must be physically possible,
that is, ∆∗ ⊆ E . But the assumption that G is simplex-
embeddable also implies that every physically realizable
effect is contained in the hypercube ∆∗, so that E ⊆∆∗.
The conjunction of these gives that E = ∆∗. By a final
appeal to the no restriction hypothesis, we have that the
state space is the dual of the effect space, Ω = E∗, and
consequently Ω=∆.
Unlike the stronger result proven below, this theorem
holds only for embeddings into simplicial GPTs of the same
dimension as the given GPT.
This lack of a dimension gap is what was assumed in
related work [38] by Shahandeh, which considered the con-
sequences of a notion termed broad noncontextuality. The
latter differs from the notion of generalized noncontextu-
ality insofar as the set of response functions associated to
physically realizable GPT effects are assumed to be tomo-
graphically complete not just for distributions associated
to physically realizable GPT states over (which is all that
generalized noncontextuality demands) but for all distribu-
tions over ontic states. This additional assumption implies
that any simplex embedding will be without a dimension
gap.
Secondly, in Ref. [53], it was demonstrated that the
lack of a dimension gap can be derived under certain as-
sumptions (in particular, the assumption that the GPT is
tomographically local).
However, the above theorem can be strengthened to
remove the assumption that there is no dimension gap.
The following is an adaptation of a theorem first proved by
Shahandeh in [38].
Theorem 4 (Classicality of GPTs satisfying the no-re-
striction hypothesis). For any GPT which satisfies the
no-restriction hypothesis, that is, where E=Ω∗, simplex-
embeddability and simpliciality are equivalent.
Proof. Using Theorem 2 we know that simplex embeddabil-
ity is equivalent to the existence of an ontological model of
the GPT. This ontological model is specified in terms of
some linear representation maps µ˜ and ξ˜ . The fact that
µ˜ is a linear map on Ω implies that, for each λ, µ˜ (λ) is a
linear functional on Ω, and the fact that ξ˜ is a linear map
on E implies that, for each λ, ξ˜ (λ) is a linear functional on
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E . Riesz’s representation theorem further implies that for
each λ there must exist vectors eλ and sλ in V such that
µ˜ (λ)=〈eλ, 〉 (E1)
ξ˜ (λ)=〈 ,sλ〉. (E2)
The no-restriction hypothesis then implies that eλ∈E and
sλ∈Ω for all λ∈Λ.
Next, note that for any fixed s∈Ω, it holds that for all
e∈E :
〈e,s〉=
∑
λ
µ˜s(λ)ξ˜e(λ) (E3)
=
∑
λ
µ˜s(λ)〈e,sλ〉 (E4)
=
〈
e,
∑
λ
µ˜s(λ)sλ
〉
, (E5)
and hence tomography of the GPT implies that
s=
∑
λ
µ˜s(λ)sλ (E6)
for every s∈Ω. Because µ˜s(λ) is a probability distribution,
this implies that every GPT state vector s can be written
as a convex combination of the states {sλ}.
Now consider some vertex v∈Vert[Ω], and decompose it
as
v=
∑
λ
µ˜v(λ)sλ. (E7)
As v is a vertex (i.e., it is convexly extremal), it must be
the case that for any λ such that µ˜v(λ) 6=0, we have sλ=v.
This immediately implies that distinct vertices have ontic
representations with disjoint support on the ontic state
space. The proof is by contradiction. Consider distinct ver-
tices v,w∈Vert[Ω] and assume that their representations
have overlapping support, that is, assume that there exists
λ∗∈ Λ such that µ˜v(λ∗) 6=0 and µ˜w(λ∗) 6=0. In this case,
we could infer that v=sλ∗ and w=sλ∗ , contradicting the
hypothesis that v and w are distinct.
Now let us consider two decompositions of some state
s∗∈Ω into vertices:∑
v∈Vert[Ω]
αvv=s∗=
∑
w∈Vert[Ω]
βww (E8)
If the state space is not a simplex, then there must exist
non-unique decompositions. However, we will now show
that these two decompositions are necessarily the same,
and hence that Ω is a simplex.
Applying µ˜ to these two decompositions, linearity of µ˜
implies that ∑
v∈Vert[Ω]
αvµ˜v=
∑
w∈Vert[Ω]
βwµ˜w. (E9)
Since the µ˜v all have disjoint support, it must be that αv=
βv for all v∈Vert[Ω], and hence the two decompositions are
in fact identical. So there are no non-unique decompositions
of states, and hence Ω must be a simplex. By the assumed
no-restriction hypothesis, we also infer that E = Ω∗, and
hence the GPT is simplicial.
What this means is that any GPT that is simplex-
embeddable but not itself simplicial asserts the existence of
some candidate states or some candidate effects (or some
of both) which are logically possible (in the sense that they
would yield valid probabilities) but stipulated to be not
physically realizable. That is, such GPTs must necessarily
violate the no-restriction hypothesis. The divergence of
weak and strong notions of nonclassicality is therefore only
manifest when we go beyond the special class of GPTs
which satisfy the no-restriction hypothesis.
To show that the distinction between weak and strong
nonclassicality disappears for all and only GPTs satisfying
the no-restriction hypothesis, it remains only to establish
the ‘only’ half of the implication. This is the easy half.
The only GPTs which satisfy both the condition of being
simplicial and the condition of being simplex-embeddable
are those that are simplicial, and these clearly satisfy the
no-restriction hypothesis.
